600th Anniversary of Agincourt and the Band Of Brothers Speech by Henry V.

I had the honor of studying history with Louis Morton, a noted military historian. Agincourt was studied as a great victory of the few, The Band of Brothers as Shakespeare named them in ‘Henry V,” over the many, the French knights and soldiers who were slaughtered. This is an important moment in history, a mere 600 years ago.

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Thanks to Josh Gelernter in National Review Online.

Six hundred years ago this weekend, a wet and battered English army was fleeing France. King Henry V of England had invaded, hoping to press a claim to the French throne — a weak claim that was made stronger by the French king’s being insane: Charles VI believed, at times, that he was made of glass, and lived in deathly fear that someone would break him. Henry believed this made it a good time to undo England’s failure to capture France during during act 1 of the Hundred Years’ War. In August of 1415, Henry invaded Normandy and attacked the fortified city of Harfleur; he won, but the fight had taken a month and a half and cost Henry a third of his army. With a bitter, rainy autumn already giving way to winter, Henry decided that discretion would be the better part of valor. The last English possession on the continent, Calais, was a ten-day march away; that was where Henry and his army of 6,000 headed. Scouts soon reported that the English were being shadowed by the French army, which — after failing to assemble in time to reinforce Harfleur — was bent on revenge. The French force outnumbered Henry’s four or five to one, and blocked his way home. Henry had two choices: first, to offer himself to France as a captive for ransom, or, second, to fight a battle he was almost certain to lose. Henry sent his decision though a French herald named Montjoy: “Go bid thy master well advise himself: If we may pass, we will. If we be hindered, we shall your tawny ground with your red blood discolor . . . The sum of all our answer is but this: We would not seek a battle, as we are. Nor as we are, we say we will not shun it.” At least, that’s what he said according to Shakespeare. See, Henry was not only marching to one of the most important battles in European history, he was marching toward one of the defining moments in the English language: the Battle of Agincourt, and the Band of Brothers speech. The English army had walked 200 miles and was totally exhausted. Henry’s thousand knights had virtually no food left; his 5,000 archers were living off foraged berries. They were two days from Calais, but a French army of (a best-guessed) 25,000 men had camped ahead of them on the road. That night, Henry confessed his sins and heard Mass. The next morning — October 25, 1415 — he and his men lined up for battle a thousand yards in front of the French. The French herald, Montjoy, was a real person. It’s entirely possible that, as he does in Shakespeare’s play, Montjoy approached Henry again, as the armies took position, and repeated the offer of peace in exchange for the King’s surrendering himself for ransom. ADVERTISING I pray thee, bear my former answer back:” says Henry. “Bid them [defeat] me and then sell my bones. Good God! Why should they mock poor fellows thus? . . . We are but warriors for the working-day; our gayness and our gilt are all besmirched with rainy marching in the painful field — but by the mass, our hearts are in the trim!” Hearts-in-trim was about all Henry could claim. Historically speaking, the English had a single line of men-at-arms — that is, knights and other professional, armor-wearing soldiers — flanked by archers. The French had three lines, each one larger than Henry’s, backed up by cavalry. Defeat seemed certain. Four men who witnessed the battle wrote accounts of it; they agree on all the major points, leaving historians in little doubt as to what happened. Nonetheless, what happened seems inexplicable. The French were well fed and well rested. Henry hoped to fight from a defensive position, but the French knew they had time and food on their side, and refused to budge. Henry relented, and marched his men to within two or three hundred yards of the French — close enough for his archers to begin firing, in hopes of provoking a French attack. According to the great military historian John Keegan, the English archers’ volleys couldn’t have had much physical effect on the French knights, who were heavily armored in steel. But, as Henry had hoped, it was enough to goad them into a cavalry charge — directly into a line of sharpened pikes the English archers had driven into the ground. “A horse, in the normal course of events, will not gallop at an obstacle it cannot jump or see a way through,” says Keegan. “Even less will it go at the sort of obviously dangerous obstacles which the archers’ stakes presented.” But that’s exactly what happened: For an unknown reason (could they not see what they were riding toward?) the horses were driven by their riders into the spiked defenses. Many of the horses were killed; many others had their riders knocked to the ground. The de-horsed men were killed where they lay. The rest retreated — either because of frightened men or frightened horses — and crashed directly into the approaching first line of French infantry. The oncoming line broke, trying to dodge the escaping cavalry, and was thrown into chaos. Nonetheless, buoyed by its overwhelming manpower advantage, it continued toward the English line: men-at-arms flanked by the archers. The English men-at-arms were outnumbered roughly eight to one by each of the three French lines — but soon, according to several eyewitness accounts, the French dead were piled in heaps six feet high. “Six feet high” is probably an exaggeration. Historians assure us it’s not possible to pile bodies more than two or three feet high, without rigor mortis having set in. Nonetheless, within minutes, thousands and thousands of French had been killed, with hardly a single casualty on the English side. The witnesses don’t explain exactly what happened; what’s guessed to have happened is this: The French had shortened their lances for dismounted fighting; the English had not. With longer lances, the English were able to begin stabbing the French before the French could stab them back. The French line was so deep that the men in the rear couldn’t see what was going on; they pushed the men in front of them forward, like the jerks in an airport security line. What the men in front were being pushed into was, more or less, a meat grinder. Meanwhile, the second line of French infantry arrived and began to push the first, likewise unaware what was happening at the front. The crush of French soldiers was so great that the men actually doing the fighting had difficulty moving their arms, let alone themselves. Seeing the foundering French, the English archers — who were out of arrows anyway — ran to join the fight, attacking the French flanks with weapons they scooped up from the piles of corpses. In the space of a half-hour, six or eight thousand Frenchmen had been killed, and two or so thousand more had been taken prisoner. Fearing a second attack from the remaining French cavalry, Henry — in a famous act of savagery — ordered the execution of all French prisoners. The order was savage, but not illogical: There were more French knights who had been taken prisoner than there were English knights in total; Henry feared they would re-arm themselves, as his archers had, and attack from his rear. When he issued the execution order, though, he was rebuffed: His knights refused to kill the unarmed prisoners. So Henry ordered his archers to do the job instead; they weren’t bound by the code of chivalry. (Keegan argues that it’s unlikely many prisoners were actually killed; he suggests the execution order was more of a show to frighten the POWs than an actual call to massacre: “some [prisoners] would have been killed in the process, and quite deliberately, but we need not reckon their number in the thousands, perhaps not even in the hundreds.” Still, legendary or not, the incident is a quintessential violation of the rules of war.) According to Shakespeare’s play, the English had lost just 30 men. In reality, the English dead probably numbered between one and two hundred; still, it was an astounding ratio. According to Shakespeare’s play, the English had lost just 30 men. In reality, the English dead probably numbered between one and two hundred; still, it was an astounding ratio: Every dead Englishman had taken scores of Frenchmen with him. France’s military leadership had been decimated: The constable of France — the French army’s commander-in-chief — had been killed; so had the admiral of France, the master of crossbowmen, and the master of the royal household. France’s aristocracy had fared even worse: Three dukes were dead, along with eight counts and 90 lower-ranked nobles. The marshal of France, two more dukes, and two more counts had been taken prisoner. Soon, the French would sign a surrender; Henry V would take control of France, marry King Charles’s daughter, and unite the French and English monarchies. Keegan sums up the Battle of Agincourt as “a victory of the weak over the strong, of the common soldier over the mounted knight, of resolution over bombast, of the desperate, cornered and far from home, over the proprietorial and cocksure.” In his play, Shakespeare apologizes for having tried to sum it up at all, with his “rough and all-unable pen.” He may have been selling himself short. As the weary English prepare for battle, Shakespeare shows Henry’s nobles fearing inevitable defeat. Henry overhears the earl of Westmoreland wish the English had 10,000 soldiers more: Then maybe it would be a fair fight. Henry accosts him: “What’s he that wishes so, my cousin Westmoreland? . . . If we are marked to die, we are enough to do our country loss — and if to live, the fewer men, the greater share of honor. God’s will! I pray thee, wish not one man more. . . . Rather, proclaim it, Westmoreland, through my host, that he which hath no stomach to this fight, let him depart. His passport shall be made, and crowns for convoy put into his purse — we would not die in that man’s company that fears his fellowship to die with us! “This day is called the feast of Crispian. He that outlives this day, and comes safe home, will stand a tip-toe when this day is named . . . strip his sleeve and show his scars and say, ‘These wounds I had on Crispin’s day!’ Old men forget — yet all shall be forgot, but he’ll remember with advantages what feats he did that day . . . And Crispin Crispian shall ne’er go by from this day to the ending of the world but we in it shall be remembered. We few, we happy few, we band of brothers. For he today that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile, this day shall gentle his condition. And gentlemen in England now a-bed shall think themselves accursed they were not here — and hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks that fought with us upon Saint Crispin’s day!”

(Author’s Note: This piece was written just moments after the Mets clinched an NLDS victory — a victory greater, more astounding, and more remarkable than any since Agincourt.) — Josh Gelernter writes weekly for NRO and is a regular contributor to The Weekly Standard. He is a founder of the tech startup ach.
Read more at: http://www.nationalreview.com/article/425729/henry-v-agincourt

THE WASHINGTON NATIONALS’ HORRIBLY DISAPPOINTING SEASON, WHAT WENT WRONG?

I grew up a Washington baseball fans for either the Senators or Nationals, the names seemed to change. I became a Minnesota Twins fan when the original Washington team and I were both moved to that state. My friend, Paul Mirengoff of Powerlineblog.com, still lives in Washington and suffered through the very disappointing 2015 season. Here’s his view of that season. He is an excellent writer and I share his observations.
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The regular baseball season ended yesterday, which means the end of the line for the disappointing 2015 Washington Nationals. The bookmakers pre-season favorites to make the World Series limped home in second place in their division, 7 games behind the New York Mets, with a record of 83-79. Today they fired manager Matt Williams.

Washington fans are debating whether the Nats’ season represents the biggest disappointment by a Washington team in memory. I say it does. The hockey team has often been disappointing in the playoffs. But anything can happen in the playoffs, and at least the Caps have made the playoffs when expected to.

The 2000 Redskins were very disappointing if one believed that the acquisition of past their prime (time) Deion Sanders and Bruce Smith made them a Super Bowl contender. I didn’t, but I did buy into the 2015 Nats.

So what went wrong?

We can start with the usual suspect — injuries. The team began the season without the services of the three batters at the top of their projected lineup: Denard Span, Anthony Rendon, and Jayson Werth. Not long after that, they lost their talisman Ryan Zimmerman (projected to bat fifth) for an extended period. That’s half of the lineup. None of the four managed to play 100 games this year. Span played only 61.

Ace starting pitcher Steven Strasburg missed 10 starts and must have been ailing in many more. His ERA was above 5.00 when the team finally shut him down in early July. After returning in August, he was so good that he ended the season with a 3.46 ERA.

These are only the most significant injuries.

But the team was relatively healthy when it headed into the back stretch of the season tied with the Mets. Thus, injuries can only carry the analysis so far.

A second key factor was (ex)manager Williams. Commenting about Yogi Berra’s managerial career, I wrote “isn’t it amazing how well ‘bad’ managers perform when they have a reliable closer?” Matt Williams had a reliable closer throughout this season yet managed poorly. That’s because he was a bad manager, not a “bad” manager.

For most of the season, Williams rigidly followed the unwritten rules for using relief pitchers (use closers only in “save” situations, never in a tie game; have them pitch only one inning, the ninth; always let them start that inning; etc.). As I have often complained, these “rules” seem designed to prevent managers from thinking, to protect them from being second-guessed, and to enable closers to amass impressive numbers of saves and thus help their bargaining position at contract time.

They shouldn’t dictate decisions in important games. For example, slavish adherence to the unwritten rules should be eschewed when you’re playing the team you’re tied for first place with in a three-game series in August, as the Nats did this year.

The Nats dropped all three games, two of them by just one run. Neither of Williams’ relief aces (Drew Storen and Jonathan Papelbon) appeared in any of the games. Why? Because the formula was never right for them to be called on.

This is just the tip of the iceberg of Williams’ poor decisions. But he’s gone now, so let’s move on to. . .

Ian Desmond, who next to Bryce Harper was the most heralded Nats regular that played regularly. Desmond reportedly turned down a seven-year $107 million contract extension. He thus entered the season knowing he would not be back next year.

That’s okay. Players do this all the time. But under the pressure of playing for his next contract, Desmond proved unable to perform at his usual high level. In fact, we were well into the season before he could be counted on to make a routine defensive play.

Desmond’s struggles at the plate lasted even longer. After the Mets swept the Nats in early August, Desmond’s batting average stood at just .216. He would raise it to .233 by the end of the season. But with so many regulars hurt early in the year, the Nats needed consistent production from Desmond, a clubhouse leader. They didn’t get it.

Then, there’s Drew Storen. Brilliant in the closer role, he was demoted to eighth inning man when the Nats acquired Papelbon. He was fine in this role for a few games, but then collapsed.

On August 6, his ERA was 1.52. By the end of the month, it was 3.24 and by season’s end 3.44. Moreover, Storen blew several big leads in important games.

Many blame management for moving him up one inning. Is there a causal relationship? I don’t know, but Storen also pitched poorly after losing the closer role in 2013, so maybe there is.

It’s difficult for me to understand, or sympathize with, a pitcher who goes into a tailspin because he’s assigned to pitch a different inning. And it’s difficult to be confident that such a pitcher won’t let you down as a closer when it really matters (as Storen has done in the playoffs).

The old school would have it that pitching one inning is pitching one inning, regardless of the inning’s number. I’m with the old school on this one.

Speaking of the old school brings us to the Jonathan Papelbon-Bryce Harper dust-up. This incident, in which, after an argument, Harper challenged Papelbon to a fight and the latter commenced trying to choke the team’s superstar, occurred after the Nats were out of the pennant race. It’s worth considering nonetheless.

The fight must be understood in the context of an incident that occurred a few days earlier. Papelbon threw two pitches at Orioles star Manny Machado, who had a key home run off of Max Scherzer and spent some time admiring it. After the game, Harper complained, “I’ll get drilled [in retaliation] tomorrow.”

I’m not old school enough to defend throwing at Machado. But Harper’s comment reinforced the suspicion that for Harper, it’s always about Harper.

If Papelbon’s pitch had led to a fight with the Orioles, he would have had the right to expect his teammates to defend him. The least he could expect from Harper was not to be thrown under the bus before the media.

Keep in mind too that Papelbon was probably acquired not just because of his ability as a reliever, but also to add some attitude to the team. He’s known to be a S.O.B., and unlike the Nats, he has a history of post-season success and a World Series ring.

Papelbon almost certainly had Harper’s comment in mind when, a few days later, he yelled at the young superstar for not “running out” a pop-up. The criticism was silly — Harper ran it out to first base. Yes, he stopped there, but few players would have headed to second on an obvious out in the context of this game.

Harper tried to brush off the criticism at first, but when Papelbon persisted, Harper reportedly said “let’s f___ing go” and the brief fight was on. (Manager Williams, by the way, didn’t know it had taken place even though two of his coaches helped break it up).

Papelbon later took the blame, as he should have. In his comments, though, he made several references to “brothers” and added, “next year when we are in the thick of it and we’re grinding together and big games mean something, we’ll pick each other up.” I take this mean that Harper did not behave like a “brother” or pick Papelbon up after the Machado incident.

Papelbon may not be around next year to be Harper’s brother. Harper had a monster year, and it’s not wise to fight with face of the franchise. Let’s hope, though, that the face of the franchise adopts a less self-centered attitude going forward.

Speaking of attitude, that of the local fans and media puzzles me. They continued to treat Desmond like a hero even as he was about to walk out on the team and was helping to sink its pennant prospects in the process. One writer even criticized management for not holding some sort of ceremony for the shortstop.

As I said, there’s nothing reprehensible about Desmond selling his services to the highest bidder. But he doesn’t deserve a parade.

The fans’ reaction to the Harper-Papelbon fight seemed over the top. The Washington Post collected some of the reaction:

“We don’t need a player like that on the team,” Patty MacEwan of Alexandria said, sitting in front of a sign asking the team to designate Papelbon for assignment. “That was assault; I don’t care what anyone else says.”

Another, Angela Halsted of Arlington, said she had trouble sleeping Sunday night because of the incident.

“I thought what he did was completely out of line, totally toxic, and the whole boys-will-be-boys response to it was really disturbing to me,” she said. “I don’t want someone like Papelbon on that team.”

After a third fan pledged to donate $100 to a charity of the team’s choice if Papelbon was jettisoned, fellow travelers promised thousands of dollars of additional donations. . . .

Jocelyn Dorfman had never before jeered a player on her favorite team; she said she would have reconsidered her fandom had Papelbon been in uniform Monday.

“I think he’s just horrible, and I think he will have a despicable impact on this team,” she said, while pledging an entire paycheck to charity if Papelbon is removed from the roster. “I still am not able to process what happened. I have two master’s degrees in psychology, and I can’t process that behavior.”

(Emphasis added)

Hide the women and children, the Nats have a mean hombre on their team. Avert your eyes, professional athletes have had a scrap.

Only in Washington, D.C. (I hope). Maybe we’re getting the baseball team we deserve.

UPDATE: Lee Smith, a brilliant analyst of the Middle East, argued in the Weekly Standard that Nats fans should blame general manager Mike Rizzo, not Matt Williams. It seems to me, however, that his article mostly highlights Williams’ deficiencies.

Smith makes the excellent point that situational hitting was mostly a foreign concept to the Nats. That’s on field management, it seems to me.

The Washington Post recounted how, when mired in a slump, Ian Desmond asked his coach (and friend) Randy Knorr for a tip. Knorr told him to stop swinging from the heels all the time.

The advice, which I think applied to most of the team’s hitters, helped Desmond. But why did Desmond have to ask for it? This too is on field management.

It’s true that Rizzo assembled the team. But the talent he assembled is formidable.

It’s also true that Rizzo has had good luck (Strasburg and Harper were available in back-to-back seasons when the Nats had the first draft pick) and that he has made some mistakes (most notably hiring Williams).

But I’m hard pressed to see as Rizzo as a major culprit given the team’s record before he arrived and its record in the past four years, during which the Nats have won two division titles and had seasons of 98 and 96 wins.